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UMBRELLA CLAUSES IN BILATERAL INVESTMENT
TREATIES: OF BREACHES OF CONTRACT, TREATY
VIOLATIONS, AND THE DIVIDE BETWEEN
DEVELOPING AND DEVELOPED COUNTRIES IN
FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES
Jarrod Wong *

INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, the face of international investment law has
changed radically as an ever-increasing percentage of disputes over foreign
investment are being resolved through international arbitration as opposed
to diplomatic intervention or domestic lawsuits. The driving force behind
this change has been the proliferation of the bilateral investment treaty
(“BIT”), an agreement between two countries that governs the treatment of
investments made in their respective territories by individuals and corporations from the other country. 1 The BIT serves to attract foreign investment
by granting broad investment rights to investors and creating flexibility in
the resolution of investment disputes. This flexibility typically includes
allowing for any investment dispute to be resolved by international arbitration, 2 most often under the auspices of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”).3 In the last twelve years alone,
* Former Legal Adviser at the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. J.D., University of California
at Berkeley (Boalt Hall), 1999; LL.M., University of Chicago, 1996; B.A. (Law), Cambridge University, 1995. I am grateful to Greg Richardson, Jonathan Westen and Angela Banks for their helpful
comments. All opinions and errors remain my own.
1 The already -substantial literature on BITs continues to expand apace with the growth of BITs.
See, e.g., RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGARET STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT T REATIES (1995); U.N.
Conference on Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”), Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1959-1999, Geneva, Switz., Dec. 2000, U.N. Doc UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2; UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties In
The Mid-1990s, Geneva, Switz., Nov. 1998, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/7 [hereinafter Bilateral
Investment Treaties in the Mid -1990s]; KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, UNITED STATES INVESTMENT
TREATIES: POLICY ANDP RACTICE (1992).
2 See UNCTAD, Dispute Settlement: Investor-State 41, Geneva, Switz., May 2003, U.N. Doc
UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/30 (noting that in a survey of 335 BITs in force in 1992, 334 contained provisions
for arbitration), available at http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Download.asp?docid=3496&lang=1&int
ItemID=2314.
3 See Christoph Schreuer, Travelling the BIT Route -- Of Waiting Periods, Umbrella Clauses and
Forks in the Road, 5 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 231, 231 (2004) (“Most [provisions in BITs for
investor-State arbitration] refer to . . . ICSID.”); M. SORNARAJAH, THE I NTERNATIONAL LAW ON
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various countries concluded approximately 1,500 new BITs.4 This brings
the total number of BITs to approximately 2,400, making the BIT one of
the most widely used international agreements for protecting and influencing foreign in vestment.5 Not surprisingly, this dramatic increase in the use
of BITs has led to a surge in the number of arbitrations involving investment treaties.6
One of the more controversial issues that has arisen in arbitration is
the proper construction of the so-called “umbrella clause,” a provision
found in many BITs that imposes a requirement on each Contracting State
to observe all in vestment obligations entered into with investors from the
other Contracting State. In particular, two recent ICSID decisions, SGS v.
Pakistan7 and SGS v. Philippines,8 have brought to the forefront the question of whether the umbrella clause applies to obligations arising under
otherwise independent investment contracts between the investor and the
FOREIGN INVESTMENT 251 (2d ed. 2004) (“Most dispute settlement provisions in investment treaties
refer to ICSID arbitration.”) See also REED ET AL., GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION 4 (2004) (noting that
“many, if not most, BITs include the option of ICSID dispute resolution”). On the ICSID Convention,
see Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States,
Aug. 27, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159.
4 Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public
International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1522 (2005).
5 See UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2005: T RANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND
I NTERNATIONALIZATION OF R&D at 24, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2005, U.N. Sales No. E.05.II.D.10
(2005) [hereinafter WORLD I NVESTMENT REPORT] (stating that the total number of BITs worldwide was
2,392 as of the end of 2004), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2005_en.pdf; Jeswald W.
Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties
and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT’L L. J. 67, 67 (2005); see also SHERIF H. SEID , GLOBAL
REGULATION OF FOREIGN DIRECT I NVESTMENT 51 (2002) (noting that “in just over four decades, the
bilateral investment treaty has become of the most important legal instruments affecting foreign invest ment”).
6 Whereas only a handful of arbitrations involved claims under investment treaties before the mid
1990s, over ninety such arbitrations have been registered with ICSID alone, encompassing claims
ranging anywhere from 100 million to billions of dollars. Franck, supra note 4, at 1521; see Stanimir A.
Alexandrov, Breaches of Contract and Breaches of Treaty --The Jurisdiction of Treaty-based Arbitration Tribunals to Decide Breach of Contract Claims in SGS v. Pakistan and SGS v. Philippines, 5 J.
WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 555, 555 (2004); see also Schreuer, supra note 3, at 231 (noting that
“[i]n recent years, the majority of cases in investment arbitration have been based on bilateral invest ment treaties”).
7 Société Général de Surveillance S. A. v. Pakistan, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to
Jurisdiction, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/13 (2003), available at http://www.worldbank.org/ics
id/cases/SGS-decision.pdf. The Members of the Tribunal were Judge Florentino P. Feliciano (President), André Faurès and J. Christopher Thomas. Id.
8 Société Général de Surveillance S. A. v. Philippines, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to
Jurisdiction, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/6 (2004), reprinted in 19 MEALEY'S INT’L . ARB. REP.
6 (2004). The Members of the Tribunal were Ahmed S. El-Kosheri (President), James Crawford and
Antonio Crivellaro. Id.

2006]

UMBRELLA CLAUSES IN BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES

139

host State. The significance of such an application is that the international
arbitration tribunal constituted under the BIT (the “BIT tribunal”) would
thereby have jurisdiction over breach-of-contract claims since a breach of
the investment contract is also a breach of the umbrella clause. Critically,
this means that the investor can now seek redress of a breach of any investment contract between it and a Contracting State through international
arbitration under the BIT.
While purporting to shed light on this question, the SGS decisions
have only confused the issue by adopting conflicting yet self-defeating interpretations of the umbrella clause that result in its nullification. To wit:
SGS v. Pakistan determined that a BIT tribunal does not have jurisdiction
over contractual claims on the ground that umbrella clauses do not in general extend to such claims,9 whereas SGS v. Philippines, though deciding to
the contrary that a BIT tribunal in fact has such jurisdiction, went on to
determine that it should not exercise this jurisdiction where the contract
contains an exclusive forum selection clause designating a different forum
for resolving disputes arising under the contract.10
In focusing on the SGS decisions, this article seeks to answer the two
principal issues raised therein, namely:
(1) Whether a BIT tribunal may exercise jurisdiction over breach-ofcontract claims on the ground that the umbrella clause applies to investorState contracts; and if so,
(2) Whether a BIT tribunal may exercise such jurisdiction when the
contract contains an exclusive forum selection clause designating a different forum for the resolution of contractual disputes.
Contrary to the SGS decisions, this article answers both questions in
the affirmative. It concludes that the better interpretation is that an umbrella
clause enables a BIT tribunal to exercise jurisdiction over claims concerning such breaches of contract, which are also BIT violations under the
clause, and further permits the tribunal to do so notwithstanding an exclusive forum selection clause in the contract. Indeed, as detailed below, any
other interpretation of the umbrella clause, including those advanced by the
SGS decisions, effectively eviscerates the umbrella clause, and is at odds
with the clear language and purpose of the clause as reflected in its history. 11 In particular, the SGS interpretations would deprive the investor of
the ability to resolve contractual investment disputes in a neutral and international forum, an intended core benefit of BITs. When the agreement be9

See Pakistan, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/13 ¶¶ 163-174.
See Philippines, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/6 ¶¶ 113-129, 136-155
11 See infra Part IV.
10
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tween the Contracting States affirmatively provides for such a benefit, the
host State must be held to its side of the bargain. 12
More broadly, however, this article not only analyzes how the umbrella clause should operate, it also considers its place in the historical context of the development of foreign investment law in recent decades. From
this vantage, the application of the umbrella clause reveals not just the differences between breaches of contract and treaty violations, but something
altogether less obvious. One sees that the debate over interpretation is actually the latest incarnation of a long-standing and continuing conflict between the investment interests of developing countries and developed countries.
Historically, foreign investment capital flows from developed to developing countries. As a result, a significant proportion of BITs are between developed countries on the one hand and developing countries on the
other. For the same reason, in many such arrangements, the investor is from
a developed country and the host State is a developing country. Therefore,
even though such a BIT imposes reciprocal obligations on both Contracting
States, its effects are asymmetrical. The result is that developing countries
seek to interpret restrictively any BIT provision that accords rights to the
investor and imposes obligations on the host State, whereas developed
countries will read the same provision expansively. The umbrella clause is
just such a BIT provision. Thus, the disagreement over umbrella clauses in
this scenario is in effect an extension of the enduring tension between developing and developed countries on foreign investment.
More than just a historical exercise, this broader perspective of the
umbrella clause anticipates a potentially divisive objection to the interpretation of umbrella clauses proposed here. Namely, by favoring the investor,
the interpretation sides with the developed country against the developing
country, which presumably has less bargaining power in negotiating a BIT.
In other words, to enforce the umbrella clause is potentially to enforce an
unconscionable contract involving a developing country under economic
pressure to enter into a BIT with an umbrella clause. But this argument is
misplaced. For one thing, it may equally be contended that the presence of
an exclusive forum selection clause in an investment contract designating
domestic courts reflects a similar disparity in bargaining power between the
host State and the investor, and to enforce such a clause is to enforce an
unconscionable contract that unfairly penalizes the investor.13 Indeed, as
between the two, the enforcement of the umbrella clause, rather than the
forum selection clause, inspires more confidence that a just result will follow since the former allows disputes to be resolved through international
12
13

See infra Part IV.C.
See infra Part V.B.
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arbitration—a neutral forum in which both parties have an equal say in the
appointment of the tribunal—whereas the latter requires disputes to be resolved by a domestic court whose own government is an interested party in
the process.
Further, carried to the extreme, such an argument would invalidate not
just the umbrella clause, but all BIT provisions. Fatally, the argument also
assumes that the bargain is one-sided, when, in fact, the host State stands to
benefit from the adoption of BIT provisions such as the umbrella clause
because they foster a more hospitable, and therefore, more attractive, environment for foreign investment. Allowing the host State to renege on its
agreement in the BIT creates uncertainty in the global marketplace and can
serve only to discourage foreign investment. In particular, when dealing
with a provision such as the umbrella clause, whose language, history, and
purpose dictate but one reasonable interpretation—that it applies without
exception to investment contracts—it is difficult to see why it should not be
enforced in accordance with the parties’ agreement. Rather, the more
broadly applicable principle is that of the sanctity of contract, not simply as
between the host State and the investor over an investment contract, but
also as between the Contracting States over a BIT.
To lay the foundation for this more fundamental perspective of umbrella clauses, Part I of the article begins by briefly describing the history
and evolution of foreign investment law and the BIT. Part II looks at the
origins and purpose of umbrella clauses. Part III sets out the decisions involving umbrella clauses, including the SGS cases. Part IV critically examines these decisions and advances a different interpretation of the umbrella
clause more consistent with its language and purpose. Finally, Part V pans
back to take a historical view of the debate over the umbrella clause in the
wider context of foreign investment disputes between developed and deve loping countries.
I.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW AND THE BIT

As the global economy began to normalize following World War II,
foreign capita l flowed more freely and the significance of foreign investment grew.14 While things were looking up for foreign investment, the same
could not necessarily be said for foreign investors. In particular, there was
no coherent legal framework in place to their interests. Foreign investors
looking to rely on international investment law found only “an ephemeral
structure consisting largely of scattered treaty provisions, a few questio n14

See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 5, at 68.
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able customs, and contested general principles of law.”15 This untidy colle ction of laws was woefully inadequate. For example, it failed to account for
contemporary investment practices, or even to offer investors an effective
enforcement mechanism to pursue their claims against host countries that
seized their interests or repudiated their contractual obligations.16 There was
simply no clear articulation of the rights and obligations of investors and
host states respectively. The few and frequently vague international legal
principles that existed concerning such rights and obligations were subject
to varying interpretation, engendering sharp disagreement between industrialized countries and the newly decolonized developing states. While developed countries asserted that international law imposed an obligation on
host states to protect foreign investments and to provide compensation for
injuring or seizing those interests, developing countries rejected such a
view on the grounds that it perpetuated the economic dominance of developed over developing countries, and infringed on their sovereignty by circumscribing their ability to control economic activities within their borders.17
However, with the continuing rapid expansion of foreign investment,
both sides had growing incentive to create a more conducive legal environment for international investments. Early attempts to build such a regime took the form of proposals for multilateral investment treaties, inclu ding the 1948 Havana Charter and the 1949 International Chamber of Commerce International Code of Fair Treatment of Foreign Investment.18 However, along with many subsequent efforts to establish multilateral treaties,19
these early proposals failed in part because they had to address wideranging interests of multiple countries that were ultimately too striated to
reconcile.20
Faced with failure at the multilateral level, individual European countries began a pioneering effort to negotiate foreign investment treaties with
15

Id.
See id. at 68.
17 See id. at 69.
18 Franziska Tschofen, Multilateral Approaches to the Treatment of Foreign Investment, 7 ICSID
REV.-FOREIGN I NVESTMENT L.J. 384 (1992) (surveying various attempts to create multilateral treaties
on foreign investment).
19 Such multilateral efforts included the proposed 1957 International Convention for the Mutual
Protection of Private Property Rights in Foreign Countries, the 1959 Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention,
and the 1967 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) Draft Convention
on the Protection of Foreign Property. Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 5, at 72.
20 Franck, supra note 4, at 1526 (noting that initiatives for multilateral treaties were largely unsuccessful because of “difficulties in promulgating sweeping reforms on a multilateral basis”). See
generally Tschofen, supra note 18 (discussing various attempts to create multilateral treaties on foreign
investment).
16
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developing countries on a one-to-one basis.21 Their success ushered in the
first modern bilateral investment treaties or BITs, and subsequently spurred
industrialized nations outside Europe to enter into their own BITs with individual developing countries. By 1970, just eleven years after Germany
and Pakistan concluded the first BIT, developing and developed countries
had concluded a total of eighty-three BITs.22 In the period following the late
1980s, the BIT movement again made a quantum leap forward as emerging
economies in Eastern and Central Europe, Asia, Africa and South America
opened their markets in pursuit of foreig n capital. 23 Whereas nations had
signed a little over 300 BITs by the end of 1988,24 there were close to 2,400
BITs in place at the end of 2004. 25
As its name suggests, a BIT is an agreement between two countries
that governs the treatment of investments made in the territory of each state
by individuals or companies from the other state. Although many countries
rely on their own model agreements when negotiating individual BITs,
BITs are remarkably similar in their organization and content. In general,
BITs address four substantive issues: (1) conditions for the admission of
foreign investors to the host State; (2) standards of treatment of foreign
investors; (3) protection against expropriation; and (4) methods for resolving investment disputes.26
BITs are also very similar in that they typically contain definitions of
investments,27 which are often broad,28 including the investment’s time
element. Accordingly, many BITs cover both existing and future investments.29 Thus, BITs not only provide incentive for future investment, but
can also have the effect of encouraging foreign investors to maintain existing investments.
21

See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 5, at 73.
UNCTAD, BILATERAL INVESTMENT T REATIES: 1959-1991 at 3, U.N. Sales No. E.92.II.A.16
(1992) (noting that there were “83 treaties in the 1960s”).
23 See id. at 4.
24 See Athena J. Pappas, References on Bilateral Investment Treaties, 4 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN
I NVESTMENT L.J. 189, 194-203 (1989).
25 WORLD I NVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 5, at 24.
26 George M. von Mehren et al., Navigating Through Investor-State Arbitrations: An Overview of
Bilateral Investment Treaty Claims, DISP . RESOL . J., Feb.-Apr. 2004, at 69, 70. See also SEID , supra
note 5, at 52.
27 See SEID , supra note 5, at 52.
28 See Fedax N.V. v. Venezuela, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, ICSID
(W. Bank) Case No. ARB/96/3 (1997), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 1378, 1385 (1998) (noting that a “broad
definition of investment . . . is not at all an exceptional situation. On the contrary, most contemporary
bilateral treaties of this kind refer to ‘every kind of asset’ or to ‘all assets.’”).
29 SEID , supra note 5, at 52. There are, however, a few BITs that limit their coverage to investments at the time the treaty was concluded. Id.
22
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Significantly, only states (and not the investors) enter into BITs. Notwithstanding, the investor is able to enforce directly its rights under the BIT
through the BIT’s dispute settlement provisions. These provisions typically
authorize the investor to submit an investment dispute between it and a
Contracting State to the investor’s choice of forums, often including international arbitration through ICSID. Thus, when a state enters into a BIT, it
effectively extends a standing offer to eligible investors to arbitrate any
relevant investment dispute through international arbitration. Should the
investor choose to accept the offer, it may do so often by simply initiating
arbitration proceedings, thereby perfecting the parties’ agreement to arbitrate the investment dispute.30
From the investor’s perspective, this ability to submit an investment
dispute to international arbitration is one of the BIT’s chief benefits. As that
feature is at the heart of the umbrella clause, its interpretation has signif icant implications for the investor.
II.

THE ORIGINS OF THE UMBRELLA CLAUSE31

Known variously as the mirror or parallel effect clause or pacta sunt
servanda (i.e., sanctity of contract clause),32 the umbrella clause is a treaty
provision found in many BITs that requires each Contracting State to observe all investment obligations it has assumed with respect to investors
from the other Contracting State.33 The idea behind the metaphor is that an
30

This process is described in more detail in Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID
REV.-FOREIGN I NVESTMENT L.J. 232 (1995) See also REED ET AL ., supra note 3, at 35, which notes that:
In non-contractual arbitration, the parties express their consent in two steps, each in turn.
First, the host State consents by including a standing offer to submit to ICSID jurisdiction in
its national legislation or in a bilateral or multilateral investment treaty. Second, the investor
. . . consents by accepting that offer later, either in writing to the host State at any time or by
filing a request to arbitrate with ICISD. In this way, the parties’ agreement to arbitrate is perfected.
31 For a fuller treatment of the history of the umbrella clause, see Anthony C. Sinclair, The Origins of the Umbrella Clause in the International Law of Investment Protection, 20 ARB. I NT’ L 411, 41318 (2004). In summarizing the history of the umbrella clause, this Part relies primarily on Sinclair’s
article.
32 See, e.g., Société Général de Surveillance S. A. v. Pakistan, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/13, ¶ 163 (2003), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/SGS-decision.pdf.
33 Judith Gill et al., Contractual Claims and Bilateral Investment Treaties: A Comparative Review
of the SGS Cases, 21 J. INT’ L. ARB. 397, 403 n.31 (2004) (finding that approximately 40% of a sample
of BITs taken from I NVESTMENT T REATIES (ICSID ed., 2003) contained umbrella clauses). An example
of an umbrella clause is Article X of the Switzerland-Philippines BIT, which provides that “[e]ach
Contracting Party shall observe any obligation it has assumed with regard to specific investments in its
territory by investors of the other Contracting Party.” See Société Général de Surveillance S. A. v.
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umbrella clause brings otherwise independent investment arrangements
between a Contracting State and private investors from the other Contracting State under the treaty’s “umbrella of protection.”34 Its purpose is to create an inter-state obligation to observe investment agreements that investors
may enforce when the BIT confers a direct right of recourse to arbitration.
More specifically, the history of the umbrella clause makes clear that it was
designed to allow for any breach of a relevant investment contract to be
resolved under the treaty in an international forum.
Under general international law, it is unclear whether a state breaching
a contract with an investor qualifies per se as a violation of an international
obligation. 35 Such a breach may simply be treated as a domestic commercial
matter. As such, investors were often forced to resolve any disputes over
their contracts with the host state in that state’s municipal courts and under
its domestic laws, which were vulnerable to unilateral variation by the
state.36 It was in this context that the umbrella clause first arose. Specifically, scholars have traced its origins to a 1954 draft settlement agreement
involving the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company’s (“AIOC”) claims regardin g
Iran’s oil nationalization program. 37
In 1951, AIOC’s interests under a long-standing oil concessionary
contract with Iran were effectively expropriated when a change in government led to the enactment of the Iranian Oil Nationalization Law, which
placed all oil operations in Iran in the government’s hands. 38 Thereafter,
AIOC pursued a range of ultimately unsuccessful legal options for redress,
including a failed attempt to arbitrate the claims pursuant to what turned out
Philippines, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/02/6, ¶ 34 (2004), reprinted in 19 MEALEY 'S I NT’L. ARB. REP . 6 (2004).
34 See Sinclair, supra note 31, at 412-13.
35 L ASSO OPPENHEIM , ROBERT JENNINGS & ARTHUR WATTS, OPPENHEIMER’ S INTERNATIONAL
LAW 927 (9th ed. 1992) (“It is doubtful whether a breach by a state of its contractual obligations with
aliens constitutes per se a breach of an international obligation . . . .”); Gill et al., supra note 33, at 403
(noting that “a violation of a contract entered into a state with an investor of another state is not, by
itself, a violation of international law”); Schreuer, supra note 3, at 249-50 (“It is generally accepted that
not every breach of contract by a State automatically amounts to a violation of international law . . . .”).
36 See, e.g., Sinclair, supra note 31, at 415-16 (describing how a long-standing oil concessionary
contract of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company with Iran was effectively expropriated when a change in
certain leadership positions in government led to the enactment of the Iranian Oil Nationalization Law,
which required all oil operations in Iran to be carried out by the Iranian government); see also International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (Mar. 18, 1965),
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/partB-section03.htm (noting in 1965 that “investment disputes
are as a rule settled through administrative, judicial or arbitral procedures available under the laws of the
country in which the investment concerned is made”).
37 Sinclair, supra note 31, at 415-16.
38 Id. at 414.
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to be a defective provision in the concession agreement 39 and abortive proceedings before the ICJ.40 It was not until a U.S.-sponsored coup in Iran
returned to power officials friendly to foreign interests that the dispute was
settled. 41
In accordance with advice provided by Elihu Lauterpacht to AIOC, the
proposed settlement was to be comprised of two instruments: (a) a “Consortium Agreement” between Iran and a consortium of oil companies including AIOC that would continue to operate certain Iranian oil facilities;
and (b) an “umbrella treaty” between Iran and the United Kingdom incorporating the Consortium Agreement and containing a guarantee by Iran to
fulfill the terms thereof.42 To counter the conspicuous failure of the earlier
concession agreement to protect AIOC’s interests, the proposed settlement
was deliberately structured such that any contract between Iran and AIOC
would be “incorporated or referred to in a treaty between Iran and the
United Kingdom in such a way that a breach of the contract or settlement
shall be ipso facto deemed to be a breach of the treaty.”43
The umbrella treaty both ensured that the settlement would not be exclusively governed by Iranian law (and otherwise vulnerable to its unila teral variance), and provided an interstate remedy allowing for any breach of
the settlement to be resolved by the ICJ instead of the Iranian courts.44 As it
turned out, the settlement took a different direction and the umbrella treaty
never materialized. 45
Just a few years later, however, the umbrella clause resurfaced in a
more concrete form in the 1959 Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention of Investments Abroad (“Abs-Shawcross Draft”).46 A private effort to draft rules

39 See Elihu Lauterpacht, International Law and Private Foreign Investment, 4 IND . J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 259, 271-72 (1997).
40 AIOC prevailed on the British Government, a major shareholder of AIOC, to initiate claims
against Iran with the Internat ional Court of Justice, which declined to exercise jurisdiction over the
dispute. Specifically, the Court found that it lacked jurisdiction over the dispute because the terms of
Iran’s acceptance of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction did not extend to allegations of breach of
customary international law, as opposed to treaties. Sinclair, supra note 31, at 415; Anglo-Iranian Oil
Co. Ltd. (U.K. v. Iran), 1952 I.C.J. 93 (July 22), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idecisions/i
summaries/iukisummary520722.htm.
41 See Sinclair, supra note 31, at 415.
42 Id. at 415-16.
43 Id. at 415.
44 Id. at 416-17.
45 Id. at 417.
46 The text of the Abs-Shawcross Draft is reprinted in The Proposed Convention to Protect Private Foreign Investment: A Round Table, 9 J. PUB. L. 115, 116-18 (1960) [hereinafter Abs-Shawcross
Draft].
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for the protection of foreign investments, 47 European lawyers created the
Abs-Shawcross Draft in part to address the kinds of investment disputes
that confronted AIOC.48 Article II, the umbrella clause, provides as follows:
“Each party shall at all times ensure the observance of any undertakings
which it may have given in relation to investments made by nationals of
any other Party.”49
Notably, this umbrella clause, unlike its predecessor in the proposed
AIOC settlement, applies not just to one particular agreement but to all
investment commitments undertaken by each state party with investors
from any other state party. In this way, the umbrella clause evolved to resemble more closely the umbrella clause in modern BITs.
Additionally, in requiring “the observance of any undertakings,” the
Abs-Shawcross Draft plainly included all contractual investment obligations within its scope, including those between a state and foreign private
investors,50 since an “undertaking” is generally understood to be broader
than a contract and thus encompasses obligations arising from a contract.51
Commentators at the time drew the same conclusion, including Fatouros,
who observed that Article II was “meant to cover the cases of contractual
commitments of states to aliens,” 52 and Schwarzenberger, who noted that it
“covers undertakings by contracting parties both to subjects and objects of
international law.”53

47

More specifically, the Abs-Shawcross Draft was the product of a private effort by two groups
of European lawyers led respectively by Hermann Abs, the then Chairman of Deutsche bank, and by
Hartley Shawcross, the former British Attorney-General, hence the name of the draft convention. See
Abs-Shawcross Draft, supra note 46, at 115.
48 See Sinclair, supra note 31, at 418-420 (noting that a separate draft convention that was effectively a precursor to the Abs-Shawcross Draft “was an openly acknowledged attempt to remedy the
failures reflected in such cases as Anglo -Iranian Oil Company”).
49 Abs-Shawcross Draft, supra note 46, at 116.
50 See Sinclair, supra note 31, at 421 (“The text of Article II refers to ‘any undertakings.’ There
can be no doubt that it was the author’s intention to protect, inter alia , contractual undertakings entered
into between states and foreign private investors.”).
51 ‘[U]ndertakings’ appears to be a concept wider than t hat of ‘contract’ in the technical sense of
the word. An ‘undertaking’ can, for example, describe the situation arising out of a general promise
made by a State to accord to foreign investors a particular standard of treatment, followed by an actual
invest ment made in reliance on that promise.
Sinclair, supra note 31, at 428 (quoting Elihu Lauterpacht, Drafting of Conventions for the Protection of
Investment, in INT’L COMP . L.Q., THE ENCOURAGEMENT AND P ROTECTION OF INVESTMENT IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 218, 229 (3d ed. Supp. 1962)).
52 Arghyrios A. Fatouros, An International Code to Protect Private Investment—Proposals and
Perspectives, 14 U. TORONTO L.J. 77, 88 n.80 (1961).
53 Georg Schwarzenberger, The Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention on Investments Abroad: A
Critical Commentary, 9 J. P UB. L. 147, 154 (1960).
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That the umbrella clause should be interpreted to include such contracts is consistent with its purpose. The authors of the draft Convention
explained that Article II “affirms, and attributes specific content to, the
universally accepted principle Pacta sunt servanda,”54 and explicitly noted
that the principle “applies not only to agreements directly concluded between States, but also to those between a State and foreigners . . . .”55 Thus,
the drafters intended that Article II insure a remedy lay under international
law for any breach of a state-investor contract subject to the draft convention, i.e., that the “purpose of that clause [was] to dispel whatever doubts
may possibly exist as to whether a unilateral violation of a concession contract is an international wrong.”56
Significantly, the Abs-Shawcross Draft went on to influence certain
draft conventions of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”), including the 1967 OECD Draft Convention on the
Protection of Foreign Property (“OECD Draft”).57 Article 2 of the OECD
Draft is an umbrella clause that provides as follows: “Each Party shall at all
times ensure the observance of undertakings given by it in relation to property of nationals of any other Party.”58
According to the official commentary to the OECD Draft, Article 2 is
“an application of the general principle of pacta sunt servanda” to “agreements between States and foreign nationals.”59 Additionally, the commentary not only makes clear that “[a]n undertaking may be embodied in a contract or in a concession,”60 but that “any right originating under such an
undertaking gives rise to an international right.”61 In sum, Article 2 was
clearly meant to extend to investor-State contracts and its purpose was to
allow obligations arising there under (i.e., contractual obligations) to be

54

Abs-Shawcross Draft, supra note 46, at 120.
Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).
56 Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, The Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention to Protect Private Foreign
Investment: Comments on the Round Table, 10 J. PUB. L. 100, 104-05 (1961); see also Schwarzenberger,
supra note 53, at 154-55:
If a breach of [an undertaking is given in relation to investments] is alleged . . . any such act
or omission may amount to a breach of the Convention and, thus, constitute an arbitrable
dispute under the Convention. . . . The effect of [Article II] is to transform obligations towards objects of international law, which as such are beyond the pale of international law,
into obligations under international law.
57 See OECD, Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property and Resolution of the
Council of the OECD on the Draft Convention, OECD Publication No. 23081 (October 12, 1967),
reprinted in 7 I NT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 117 (1968).
58 Id. at 123.
59 Id.
60 Id. (emphasis added).
61 Id. (emphasis in original).
55
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characterized as treaty obligations, thereby securing their protection under
international law.
As Lauterpacht noted, Article 2’s effect was to “put [investor-State
contracts] on a special plane in that breach of them becomes immediately a
breach of convention.”62 Likewise, Prosper Weil, another distinguished
commentator at that time, pointed out that:
There is, in fact, no particular difficulty when there is an “umbrella treaty” between the contracting State and the State of the other party, which turns the obligation to perform the contract into an international obligation of the contracting State vis-à-vis the State of the other
contracting party. The intervention of the umbrella treaty transforms the contractual obligations thereby ensuring, as it has already been stated, “the inviolability of the contract under
threat of violating the treaty”; any non-performance of the contract, even if it is legal under
the national law of the contracting State, gives rise to the international liability of the latter
vis-à-vis the State of the other contracting party.63

In conjunction with dispute resolution provisions in the convention,
the umbrella clause would allow for breaches of investor-State contracts to
be resolved as a matter of international law in an international forum. 64
Relevantly, the International and Comparative Law Section of the American Bar Association noted that the OECD Draft “would provide for giving
effect in an international forum to acquired rights arising from State contracts, and in this way would ensure the application of an international standard where under international law that standard should be applied.”65
Although the OECD Draft ultimately failed to pass, the OECD Council resolved at its 150th Meeting in 1967 to recommend the draft convention to member states as a model for their own BITs and as a general affirmation of international law rules applicable to foreign investment.66
Indeed, umbrella clauses had in the meantime already found their way
into BITs, including the first known BIT, the Germany-Pakistan BIT of
1959. 67 Article 7 of that BIT provides as follows: “Either party shall observe any other obligation it may have entered into with regard to invest62

Lauterpacht, supra note 51.
Alexandrov, supra note 6, at 566-7 (quoting in his own translation Prosper Weil, Problèmes
relatifs aux contrats passes entre un Etat et un particulier, in 128 Recueil des Cours 95, 130 (1969)).
See also Schreuer, supra note 3, at 250-51 (quoting the same in his own but substantially similar translation).
64 See Sinclair, supra note 31, at 430 (noting in relation to the umbrella clause in the OECD Draft
that “when coupled with a watertight dispute settlement provision the umbrella clause would create an
enforceable international obligation to observe investment contracts”).
65 COMM. ON INT’L T RADE & INV., SECTION ON I NT’L & COMPARATIVE L AW, AM. BAR ASS’N ,
THE P ROTECTION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY INVESTED ABROAD 96 (1963).
66 OECD, supra note 57.
67 See Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, F.R.G.-Pak., Nov. 25, 1959, 457
U.N.T.S. 23, 28-29 (1963).
63
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ments by nationals or companies of the other Party.”68 A German commentator observed in his survey of German BITs that such an umbrella clause
“relates particularly to investment contracts between the investor and the
host country” and “transforms responsibility incurred towards a private
investor under a contract into international responsibility.” 69 He also noted
that “[t]he protection of such contracts is now a standard clause in bilateral
investment agreements.”70
The 1959 Germany-Pakistan BIT would lay the foundation for the
1991 German Mode l BIT, Article 8(2) of which is an umbrella clause with
substantially similar language: “Each Contracting Party shall observe any
other obligation it has assumed with regard to investments in its territory by
nationals or companies of the other Contracting Party.”71
The U.S. Model BIT of 1983, which was designed with the OECD
Draft in mind, 72 also contains an umbrella clause providing that “[e]ach
Party shall observe any obligation it may have entered into with regard to
investors or nationals or companies of the other Party.”73 Subsequent U.S.
Model BITs published in 1984 and 1987 include similarly worded umbrella
clauses.74 Again, commentators analyzing these umbrella clauses agree on
their effects, namely that such a clause “raises to a treaty issue any attempt
by a BIT partner to invalidate a contract by changes in domestic law or
otherwise . . . [such that] a breach of contract constitutes a breach of
treaty.”75
Due in part to the influence of the OECD Draft, which has likewise influenced the BITs of other major developed economies, including France76
68

Id. at 28.
Joachim Karl, The Promotion and Protection of German Foreign Investment Abroad, 11 ICSID
REV.-FOREIGN I NVESTMENT L.J. 1, 23 (1996).
70 Id.
71 1991 German Model Treaty on the Encouragement and Reciprocal protection of Investments,
Sept. 1991, reprinted in 11 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INVESTMENT. L.J. 221, 226 (1996).
72 See K. Scott Gudgeon, United States Bilateral Investment Treaties: Comments on their Origin,
Purposes and General Treatment Standards, 4 INT’ L TAX AND BUS. L. 105, 111 (1986) (noting that the
US Model BIT was “specifically designed to dovetail with efforts of the OECD”).
73 1983 U.S. Model BIT art. II(4), Jan. 21, 1983, reprinted in VANDEVELDE, supra note 1, at App.
A-2.
74 See 1984 U.S. Model BIT art. II(2), Feb. 24, 1984, reprinted in VANDEVELDE , supra note 1, at
App. A-3 (“Each Party shall observe any obligation it may have entered into with regard to invest ments.”); 1987 U.S. Model BIT art. II(2), Sept. 1987, reprinted in VANDEVELDE , supra note 1, at App.
A-4 (same).
75 Gudgeon, supra note 72, at 126. See also VANDEVELDE , supra note 1, at 78 (“Under this clause
[in the US Model BIT], a party’s breach of an investment agreement with an investor becomes a breach
of the BIT.”).
76 See Sinclair, supra note 31, at 433 (noting that the French model BIT was based on the 1967
OECD Draft) (citing P. Julliard, Le Reseau Francais des conventions bilaterales d’investissments: à la
69

2006]

UMBRELLA CLAUSES IN BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES

151

and the United Kingdom,77 the umbrella clause is now commonplace in
BITs.78 Consistent with the commentary noted above concerning particular
umbrella clauses, wide-ranging surveys of BITs generally affirm that umbrella clauses allow breaches of investor-State contracts to be characterized
as BIT violations so as to trigger dispute resolution procedures provided
under the BIT. For example, the United Nations Centre on Transnational
Corporations noted that an umbrella clause “makes the respect of [investorState] contracts . . . an obligation under the treaty. Thus, a breach of such a
contract by the host State would engage its responsibility under the [BIT]
and—unless direct dispute settlement procedures come into pla y—entitle
the home State to exercise diplomatic protection of the investor.”79 Similarly, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) observed in its survey of BITs in the mid-1990s that “as a result of [an umbrella clause in a BIT], violations of commitments regarding
investment by the host country would be redressible through a BIT.”80
Thus, the sum of its history and the virtually uniform body of opinion
concerning its interpretation points unambiguously to one conclusion: The
umbrella clause applies to obligations arising under investor-State contracts
so as to allow for their breach to be resolved as BIT violations. In spite of
this background, however, the first two decisions to consider closely the
umbrella clause, SGS v. Pakistan81 and SGS v. Philippines,82 arrived at interpretations that while inconsistent with one another, have the common
effect of overturning that conclusion.

recherché d’un droit perdu?, 13 DROIT ET P RATIQUE DU COMMERCE I NTERNATIONALE 9, 16 (1987)
(Fr.)).
77 See Eileen Denza and Shelagh Brooks, Investment Protection Treaties: United Kingdom Experience, 36 I NT’ L & COMP . L.Q. 908, 910 (1987) (noting the influence of the OECD Draft on U.K.
BITs).
78 See Karl, supra note 69 (noting that “[t]he protection of such contracts is now a standard clause
in bilateral investment agreements . . . .”).
79 UNITED NATIONS CENTRE ON T RANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT
TREATIES 39 (1988).
80 Bilateral Investment Treaties in the mid -1990s, supra note 1, at 56. The study also notes that
“the language of [a typical umbrella clause in a BIT] is so broad that it could be interpreted to cover all
kinds of obligations, explicit or implied, contractual or non-contractual, undertaken with respect to
investment generally.” Id.
81 See Société Général de Surveillance S. A. v. Pakistan, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections
to Jurisdiction, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/13 (2003), available at http://www.worldbank.org/
icsid/cases/SGS-decision.pdf.
82 See Société Général de Surveillance S. A. v. Philippines, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/6 (2004), reprinted in 19 MEALEY 'S INT’L.
ARB. REP. 6 (2004).
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III. DECISIONS INVOLVING THE UMBRELLA CLAUSE
A.

SGS v. Pakistan

In SGS v. Pakistan, SGS, a Swiss company, contracted with the Republic of Pakistan in 1994 to provide “pre-shipment inspection” (“PSI”)
services with respect to certain goods destined for Pakistan. 83 Under the
agreement (the “PSI Agreement”), SGS undertook to inspect goods imported into Pakistan wit h the objective of increasing custom revenues collection by ensuring that the goods were properly classified for customs purposes.84 Some years into the contract, however, Pakistan became dissatisfied with SGS’s performance, and terminated the contract.85 Thereafter,
Pakistan commenced arbitration proceedings in Pakistan in accordance with
Article 11 of the PSI Agreement, which provided that any dispute arising
out of the PSI Agreement “shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with
the Arbitration Act of Pakistan . . . .”86
In turn, however, SGS initiated proceedings in a different forum. It
submitted instead a Request for Arbitration to ICSID,87 alleging that Pakistan’s conduct under the PSI Agreement violated its obligations under the
Switzerland-Pakistan BIT, which the two countries had concluded in the
interim in 1995. 88 Specifically, SGS alleged that Pakistan’s actions constituted violations of various BIT provisions that established substantive standards for the treatment of investments, including, for example, Pakistan’s
requirements under Articles 4(1) and 4(2) respectively to “protect” and
ensure the “fair and equitable” treatment of Swiss investments in Pakistan. 89
Additionally, SGS claimed that Pakistan was liable under the BIT for all
breaches of the PSI agreement by virtue of the umbrella clause in the BIT
(Article 11), which provided: “Either Contracting Party shall constantly

83

Pakistan, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/13 ¶ 11.
Id. ¶ 11.
85 Id. ¶ 16.
86 Id. ¶¶ 15, 26.
87 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
88 Although the 1995 BIT post -dates the 1994 PSI Agreement:
It should be noted that the BIT, by its express terms (Article 2), is made applicable to in vestments made in the territory of a Contracting Party on 2 September 1954 and onward.
Thus disputes arising in respect of investments made as early as 2 September 1954, in other
words, pre-BIT disputes, may be brought before an ICSID tribunal constituted pursuant to
the BIT [including the present dispute].
Pakistan, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/13 ¶ 153.
89 Id. ¶ 35.
84
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guarantee the observance of the commitments it has entered into with respect to the investments of the investors of the other Contracting Party.”90
An ICSID Tribunal was duly constituted and it turned first to consider
Pakistan’s objections to jurisdiction. 91 Specifically, Pakistan alleged that the
claims were essentially contractual in nature and SGS was improperly reformulating them as BIT claims.92 Since the PSI Agreement specifically
referred any disputes there under to arbitration in Pakistan, Pakistan argued
that the ICSID Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to hear SGS’s claim. 93
SGS argued, however, that under the umbrella clause in the BIT, all
contract claims were automatically “elevat[ed]” to BIT claims since Pakistan was obliged under the clause to “constantly guarantee” its investment
“commitments” to Swiss investors, which included all contractual commitments.94 As such, SGS asserted that the ICSID Tribunal had jurisdiction
over the contractual dispute.95
1.

BIT Provisions Establishing Substantive Standards of Treatment

In considering the scope of its jurisdiction, the Tribunal first considered Article 9 of the BIT, which refers to ICSID arbitration any “disputes
with respect to investments between a Contracting Party and an investor of
the other Contracting Party. . . .”96 While it is broadly rendered, the Trib unal reasoned that
[I]f Article 9 relates to any dispute at all between an investor and a
Contracting Party, it must comprehend disputes constituted by claimed
violations of BIT provisions establishing substantive standards of treatment
by one Contracting Party of investors of the other Contracting Party [since
a]ny other view would tend to erode significantly those substantive treaty
standards of treatment.97
Additionally, because the BIT was concluded after the PSI Agreement,
the parties could not have intended to subject disputes under the BIT to the
arbitration procedures laid out in the PSI Agreement.98 Accordingly, the
Tribunal determined that it had jurisdiction over those SGS claims prem-

90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98

Id. ¶¶ 97-99.
Id. ¶¶ 43-82.
Id. ¶¶ 43-45.
Id. ¶¶ 1-3.
Pakistan, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/13 ¶¶ 53-54, 98-99.
Id. ¶¶ 53-54.
Id. ¶ 149.
Id. ¶ 150.
Id. ¶ 154.
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ised on BIT provisions establishing substantive standards of treatment99 (the
“BIT claims”), including BIT Articles 3(1), 4(1)-(2) and 6(1), which relate
respectively to the promotion of investments, the protection of investments,
and expropriation. 100 Such claims were treaty claims as they were “based
not on the PSI Agreement, but rather allege a cause of action under the
BIT,” 101 it being “for the Claimant to characterize the claims as it sees
fit.”102
2.

Scope of Umbrella Clause Regarding Purely Contractual Obligations

Conversely, the Tribunal determined that it had no jurisdiction over
those SGS claims “based on alleged breaches of the PSI Agreement which
[did] not also constitute or amount to breaches of the substantive standards
of the BIT.”103 In so deciding, the Tribunal rejected SGS’s argument that
Article 11 of the BIT, the umbrella clause, automatically elevated any and
all breaches under the PSI Agreement to BIT violations.104 Noting that the
text of Article 11 “appears susceptible of almost indefinite expansion,” 105
the Tribunal considered the legal consequences attending SGS’s interpretation “so far-reaching in scope, and so automatic and unqualified and sweeping in their operation, so burdensome in their potential impact upon a Contracting Party . . . that clear and convincing evidence must be adduced by
the Claimant . . . that such was indeed the shared intent of the Contracting
Parties . . . .”106 The Tribunal, however, found no such evidence.107
Among those legal consequences the Tribunal found far-reaching was
that “Article 11 would amount to incorporating by reference an unlimited
number of State contracts, as well as other municipal law instruments setting out State commitments to an investor of the other Contract Party,” the
alleged violation of which would be treated as a BIT breach.108 Additio n99

Id. ¶ 150.
Pakistan, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/13 ¶ 96.
101 See id. ¶ 154.
102 Id. ¶ 145. The Tribunal also noted that in pleading its case, so long as “the facts asserted by the
Claimant are capable of being regarded as alleged breaches of the BIT, consistently with the practice of
ICSID tribunals, the Claimant should be able to have them considered on their merits.” Id.
103 Société Général de Surveillance S. A. v. Pakistan, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to
Jurisdiction, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/13, ¶ 162 (2003), availa ble at http://www.worldbank.
org/icsid/cases/SGS-decision.pdf.
104 Id. ¶ 163.
105 Id. ¶ 166.
106 Id. ¶167.
107 Id. ¶ 173.
108 Id. ¶ 168.
100
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ally, BIT Articles 3 to 7,109 which lay down various substantive treaty standards, would be superfluous if any simple breach of a contract between the
parties sufficed to bring the BIT into play. 110 A third consequence would
have been that an investor could nullify at will any freely negotiated dispute
settlement clause in an investor-State contract.111 In sum, SGS v. Pakistan
stands for the proposition that there is a strong presumption that umbrella
clauses do not apply to obligations arising under investor-State contracts.
B.

SGS v. Philippines

Just six months later, however, another ICSID Tribunal, in SGS v.
Philippines,112 came to a different conclusion in interpreting the umbrella
clause in the Switzerland-Philippines BIT, which provides that: “Each Contracting Party shall observe any obligation it has assumed with regard to
specific investments in its territory by investors of the other Contracting
Party.”113 At issue was the umbrella clause’s application to a dispute concerning how much the Philippines owed SGS for unpaid comprehensive
import supervision services provided under a contract between the parties
(the “CISS Agreement").114 Specifically, the question for the Tribunal was
whether it had jurisdiction over claims concerning CISS Agreement
breaches by virtue of the umbrella clause.115
109

Specifically:
[T]he substantive obligations undertaken by the Contracting Parties in Articles 3 to 7 [concern] promotion and admission of investments in accordance with the laws and regulations
of the Contracting Party (Article 3); prohibition of impairment, by ‘unreasonable or discriminating measures,’ of the management, use, enjoyment, etc. of such investments and accordin g ‘fair and equitable treatment’ to investors of the other Contracting Party (Article 4);
free cross-border transfer of payments relating to the protected investments (Article 5); prohibition of expropriation or other measures having the same nature or effect, unless taken in
the public interest, on a non-discriminatory basis, under due process of law and with provision for effective and adequate and prompt compensation (Article 6); and the most-favoredinvestor provision (Article 7).
Pakistan, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/13 ¶ 169.
110 Id. ¶ 168.
111 Id. ¶ 168. Apart from these consequences, the Tribunal also based its decision on the fact that
Article 11 was not placed in the same section of the BIT as Articles 3 to 7. Its separate location indicated to the Tribunal that Article 11 was not meant to embody a “substantive ‘first order’ obligation”
like those in Articles 3 to 7, much less supersede those provisions. Id. ¶ 170.
112 Société Général de Surveillance S. A. v. Philippines, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to
Jurisdiction, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/6 (2004), reprinted in 19 MEALEY'S INT’L . ARB. REP.
6 (2004).
113 Id. ¶ 34.
114 See id . ¶¶ 1, 12-17. The comprehensive import supervision services provided by SGS to Philippines are similar in nature to the services provided by SGS to Pakistan. Id. ¶ 95.
115 Id. ¶ 92(b).
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Scope of Umbrella Clause

Looking to the text of the umbrella clause, the Tribunal noted that in
providing for “any obligation” concerning investment between the parties,
the umbrella clause could readily be interpreted to include any obligation
that arises from a contract between the parties.116 Such an inclusive reading
of the clause was further consistent with the BIT’s purpose, which was “to
create and maintain favourable conditions for investments . . . ”117 Accordingly, the Tribunal determined that it had jurisdiction over claims arising
under the CISS Agreement since the umbrella clause, properly construed,
“makes it a breach of the BIT for the host State to fail to observe binding
commitments, including contractual commitments, which it has assumed
with regard to specific investments.”118
In determining that the umbrella clause applied to investor-State contracts, the Tribunal explicitly rejected the underlying rationale of the SGS v.
Pakistan decision. 119 While acknowledging that the umbrella clause’s wording was more vague in requiring a party to “constantly guarantee the observance of . . . commitments”120 (as compared with Article X(2) of the
Switzerland-Philippines BIT, which called for parties to “observe any obligations”),121 the Tribunal nonetheless considered the earlier decision to have
given the umbrella clause “a highly restrictive interpretation” that was not
justified by the rationales proffered.122
The Tribunal took issue with the earlier decision’s criticism of the interpretation favored by SGS as over-reaching in possibly encompassing all
manner of State actions.123 Noting that the umbrella clause was in fact limited to “obligations assumed with regard to specific investments,” the Tribunal pointed out that for it to be applicable:

116

See id. ¶ 115.
Philippines, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/6 ¶ 116 (internal quotations omitted); see also
id. ¶ 117 (“[I]f commitments made by the State towards specific investments do involve binding obligations or commitments under the applicable law, it seems entirely consistent with the object and purpose
of the BIT to hold that they are incorporated and brought within the framework of the BIT by Article
X(2).”).
118 Id. ¶ 128.
119 Id, ¶¶ 119-26.
120 Id. ¶ 119 (emphasis added) (quoting Agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Switz.-Pak.,
art. 11, Jul. 11, 1995, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/switzerland_pakista
n_fr.pdf).
121 Id. ¶ 115.
122 Philippines, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/6 ¶ 120.
123 Id. ¶ 121.
117
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[T]he host State must have assumed a legal obligation, and it must have been assumed vis-àvis the specific investment-not as a matter of the application of some legal obligation of a
general character. This is very far from elevating to the international level all the ‘municipal
legislative or administrative or other unilateral measures of a Contracting Party.’124

The Tribunal also rejected the prior decision’s characterization of a
broad interpretation of the umbrella clause as involving a full-scale internationalization of domestic contracts whereby all investment contracts are
immediately “transubstanti[ated]” into treaties.125 According to the Trib unal, an umbrella clause “does not convert questions of contract law into
questions of treaty law,” or more specifically in the case before it, Article
X(2) “does not change the proper law of the CISS Agreement from the law
of the Philippines to international law.”126 Rather, the umbrella clause “addresses not the scope of the commitments entered into with regard to specific investments but the performance of these obligations, once they are
ascertained.”127
Not only did the Tribunal find unconvincing the rationales provided in
SGS v. Pakistan, it faulted the decision for failing to give any clear meaning
to the umbrella clause.128 Relevantly, the earlier decision stated that the
umbrella clause signaled “an implied affirmative commitment to enact implementing rules . . . appropriate to give effect to a contractual or statutory
undertaking in favor of investors” and that it did not preclude the possibility that under “exceptional circumstances,” certain breaches of contract
might constitute BIT violations.129 Yet, as the Tribunal noted, “[the umbrella clause,] if it has any effect at all, confers jurisdiction on an international tribunal, and needs to do so with adequate certainty. Jurisdiction is
not conferred by way of ‘an implied affirmative commitment’ or through
the characterization of circumstances as ‘exceptional.’”130
Thus, contrary to the decision in SGS v. Pakistan, the Tribunal in SGS
v. Philippines decided that the umbrella clause applies to all breaches of the

124 Id. ¶ 121 (quoting Société Général de Surveillance S. A. v. Pakistan, Decision of the Tribunal
on Objections to Jurisdiction, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/13, ¶ 166 (2003), available at http://
www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/SGS-decision.pdf).
125 See id. ¶ 126 (quoting Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13 ¶ 172).
126 Id. ¶ 126.
127 Id. (emphasis in original).
128 Philippines, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/6 ¶ 125. The Tribunal also questioned the
finding in SGS v, Pakistan that the umbrella clause’s location at the end of the BIT (as opposed to the
part of the text that laid out substantive obligations) supported its restrictive interpretation. As the Tribunal noted, the umbrella clause must surely have some meaning, and the Tribunal found it “difficult to
accept that . . . it is legally inoperative . . . merely because of its location.” Id. ¶ 124.
129 Pakistan, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/13 ¶ 172.
130 Philippines, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/6 ¶ 125.
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relevant investor-State contract.131 The Tribunal, therefore, had jurisdiction
over contractual disputes arising under the CISS Agreement, including any
purely contractual claims that were not also premised on the BIT’s substantive provisions. 132 However, even though the Tribunal found that it had jurisdiction over SGS’s contractual claims, the Tribunal ultimately declined
to exercise such jurisdiction on the ground that it was inappropriate to do so
in this case since the Agreement contained an exclusive forum selection
clause that designated a different forum for resolving such contractual disputes.133
2.

Effect of Forum Selection Clause in Contract

Article 12 of the CISS Agreement provided that the agreement was to
be “governed in all respects by . . . the laws of the Philippines” and that
“[a]ll actions concerning disputes in connection with the obligations of either party to this Agreement shall be filed at the Regional Trial Courts of
Makati or Manila.”134 In contrast, BIT Article VIII provided the investor
with a choice of “submit[ting any disputes with respect to investments between a Contracting Party and an investor of the other Contracting Party]
either to the national jurisdiction of the Contracting Party in whose territory
the investment has been made or to international arbitration [under ICSID
or UNCITRAL].”135
In declining to exercise jurisdiction over the contractual disputes, a
majority of the Tribunal rejected SGS’s argument that the SwitzerlandPakistan BIT overrode the contract’s forum selection clause.136 Applying
the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant, the majority found that the
CISS Agreement’s forum selection clause should be given precedence over
the BIT since the former applied more specifically to the dispute at hand. 137
According to the majority, the forum selection clause applied only to dis131

See id. ¶¶ 113-28.
Id. ¶ 169(3) (concluding that “[u]nder Article VIII(2) of the BIT, the Tribunal has jurisdiction
with respect to a claim arising under the CISS Agreement, even though it may not involve any breach of
the substantive standards of the BIT”).
133 Id. ¶ 155.
134 Id. ¶ 22.
135 Id. ¶ 34.
136 Philippines, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/6 ¶¶ 140-41. The sole dissenter, Antonio
Crivellaro, specifically disagreed with the majority’s decision to stay the proceedings but otherwise
joined the Tribunal in the decision. See generally Société Général de Surveillance S. A. v. Philippines,
Decision by One of the Arbitrators (“Crivellaro Declaration”), ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/6
(2004), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/SGSvPhil-declaration.pdf.
137 Philippines, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/6 ¶ 141.
132
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putes arising out of the CISS Agreement, whereas the BIT, while applicable
to the CISS Agreement, “was not concluded with any specific investment
or contract in view” and was also potentia lly applicable to multiple investment arrangements involving other parties.138
The majority further stated that a BIT is intended by the State parties
to support and complement, rather than displace, the specific negotiated
investment arrangements between the investor and the host State.139 As
such, the majority regarded it inconsistent with the BIT’s purpose to construe it as overriding an exclusive forum selection clause in the underlying
contract.140
In his dissent, which he specifically limited to the Tribunal’s decision
to stay its proceedings, Antonio Crivellaro disagreed with the majority’s
assessment that the BIT provision overrode the contractual forum selection
clause.141 Since the BIT was entered into only after the CISS Agreement
was concluded, SGS could not possibly have waived its right to rely on the
BIT’s dispute resolution provisions when it agreed to refer contractual disputes to the courts of the Philippines under the CISS Agreement.142 Rather,
“the BIT has created a completely new law and has conferred on SGS new
or additional rights of forum selection . . . includ[ing], in particular the right
to select the forum after the dispute has arisen.”143 Additionally, given that
a central, if not the most important, advantage afforded to investors under
the BIT is their right to a choice of forums under the BIT’s dispute resolution provisions,144 as between conflicting dispute resolution provisions, “the
rule giving prevalence to the most favourable treatment [to its beneficiary]
certainly applies.”145
The major ity did not, however, address the arguments in the dissent,
except to note indirectly that the dissent’s conclusion meant that a different
answer arises depending on whether the BIT predated or postdated the relevant contract.146 Instead, the majority pointed to another finding to support
its conclusion, to wit: In bringing its claim, SGS was relying on the very
contract whose forum selection clause it had deliberately disregarded. The
majority noted that:
[W]here a claimant has expressly agreed in writing . . . that in all matters pertaining to the execution, fulfillment, and interpretation of the con138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146

Id.
Id.
See id. ¶¶ 132, 141.
Crivellaro Declaration, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/6 ¶ 4.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. ¶ 3.
Id. ¶ 10.
Philippines, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/6 ¶ 141 n.70.
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tract he will have resort to local tribunals, remedies, and authorities, and
then willfully ignores them by applying in such matters [for remedies under
broadly applicable treaties], he will be held bound by his contract.147
Put differently, “a party to a contract cannot claim on that contract
without itself complying with it.”148 SGS was thus not permitted to “approbate and reprobate in respect of the same contract,” but must bring any
claims under the CISS Agreement to the Philippines’ courts.149
Finally, the majority also made clear that its refusal to decide the dispute was an issue that went to the admissibility of the claim and not jurisdiction for “unless otherwise expressly provided, treaty jurisdiction is not
abrogated by contract.”150 That is, the majority determined that the Tribunal
had jurisdiction over the dispute, but regarded SGS’s claim to be inadmissible on account of the forum selection clause in the CISS Agreement,
which required SGS to submit the dispute to the Philippines courts.151
Significantly, such a characterization meant that the Tribunal might
yet have to resolve the claim if, for example, the Philippines courts were
unable or unwilling to resolve the dispute.152 The majority described its
situation as one where “Philippines’ responsibility under Article X(2) and
IV of the BIT—a matter which does fall under its jurisdiction—is subject to
‘the factual predicate of a determination’ by the Regional Tria l Court of
[SGS’s claim].”153
Under these circumstances, the Tribunal decided to stay the proceedings pending a resolution of the dispute by the Philippines court or through
agreement of the parties.154 Declaring that the stay of proceedings may be
lifted “for sufficient cause on application by either party,” the Tribunal ordered the parties to appraise it every six months on the status of the
claim. 155
Thus, the Tribunal in SGS v. Philippines determined that while the
umbrella clause extends in theory to all breaches of contract, it does not
override any exclusive forum selection clause in the contract and should not
be applied where the latter designates a forum other than that provided under the BIT.
147

Id. ¶ 151 (quoting The United States-Venezuela Claims Protocol, U.S.-Venez., Feb. 17, 1903,
101 B.F.S.P. 646, 2 Malloy 1870) (1903)).
148 Id. ¶ 154.
149 Id. ¶ 155.
150 Id. ¶ 154.
151 Id. ¶¶ 154-55.
152 Philippines, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/6 ¶ 170 (noting that “a party could not be
required to litigate locally if the local courts are clo sed to it due to armed conflict.”).
153 Id. ¶ 174.
154 Id. ¶ 175.
155 Id. ¶ 176.
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Decisions in the Wake of the SGS Cases

A number of international arbitration decisions following the SGS
cases have also addressed the umbrella clause, though not always with the
same level of detail. As a group, these decisions advance a broader and
more inclusive interpretation of the umbrella clause, and in that respect, are
closer to SGS v. Philippines than SGS v. Pakistan.156 However, they do not
speak with one voice on the question. 157 For instance, certain cases limit the
application of the umbrella clause to some but not all contractual obligations,158 demonstrating vividly the prevailing uncertainty in the wake of the
SGS cases.159
A case in point is Joy Mining v. Egypt.160 The Tribunal there examined
Article 2(2) of the Egypt-United Kingdom BIT, which provides in relevant
part that: “Each Contracting Party shall observe any obligation it may have
entered into with regard to investments of nationals or companies of the
other Contracting Party.”161
After declaring that it was not pronouncing judgment on the views of
other tribunals including those in the SGS cases, the Tribunal noted in dicta
its view of the umbrella clause as follows:
In this context, it could not be held that an umbrella clause inserted in
the Treaty, and not very prominently, could have the effect of transforming
all contract disputes into investment disputes under the Treaty, unless of
course there would be a clear violation of the Treaty rights and obligations
or a violation of contract rights of such a magnitude as to trigger the Treaty
protection, which is not the case. The connection between the Contract and
156

See Katia Yannaca-Small, Working Paper on International Investment, No. 2006/1: Improving
the System of Investor-State Dispute Settlement: An Overview, ¶ 132 (OECD, Working Paper No.
2006/1, 2006) (noting in its review of cases considering the umbrella clause that “there is a growing
consistency on the interpretation of [the umbrella clause’s] meaning to include ‘all obligations’ by the
State, both treaty and contractual”).
157 See id. (noting that notwithstanding “growing consistency” on the question, “the decisions . . .
do not all reach the same conclusion on the interpretation of the ‘umbrella clause’”).
158 See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 160-66.
159 Additionally, while the decisions following the SGS cases examine the question concerning
whether and to what extent the umbrella clause extends to contractual obligations, they do not appear to
discuss in any meaningful way the question raised in SGS v. Philippines on whether an umbrella clause
should apply in the presence of an exclusive forum selection clause in the contract.
160 See Joy Mining Mach. Ltd. v. Egypt, Award on Jurisdiction, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/03/11 (2004), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/joy-mining-award.pdf.
161 See Christoph Schreuer, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Jurisdiction Over Contract
Claims—the Vivendi Case Considered, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION 281,
301 (Todd Weiler ed., 2005) (quoting Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments,
Egypt-U.K., art.2, June 11, 1975, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/egypt_
uk.pdf).
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the Treaty is the missing link that prevents any such effect. This might be
perfectly different in other cases where that link is found to exist, but certainly it is not the case here.162
Similarly, the ICSID Tribunal in CMS v. Argentina found that the umbrella clause applied to some but not all contractual obligations. 163 In that
case, the Tribunal had to consider the effect of Article II(2)(c) of the Arge ntina-United States BIT, which provides that each party “shall observe any
obligation it may have entered into with regard to investments.”164 Claiming
to rely inter alia on the SGS cases and Joy Mining v. Egypt, the Tribunal
determined that the umbrella clause distinguished between “commercial
disputes” and those “disputes arising from the breach of treaty standards
and their respective causes of action.”165 According to the Tribunal, the
umbrella clause applied only to the latter, which “likely” included situations involving “significant interference by government or public agencies
with the rights of the investors.”166
In contrast to Joy Mining and CMS, however, other decisions have observed more generally that the umbrella clause extends to contractual obligations without excluding particular categories of contractual obligations
from its scope. For example, the Tribunal in Consorzio Groupement
L.E.S.I.-DIPENTA v. Algeria stated that “the effect of [umbrella] clauses is
to transform the violations of the State’s contractual commitments into violations of the treaty umbrella clause and by this to give jurisdiction to the
Tribunal over the matter . . . .”167 Indeed, at least one decision has held that
162 Joy Mining, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/11 ¶ 81. The Tribunal acknowledged earlier
in the Award that its conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction over the dispute, which fell outside the BIT,
“would render it unnecessary to discuss the other jurisdictional objections and issues raised by the
Respondent.” Id. ¶ 63. Unfortunately for the already confused state of the law, it proceeded nonetheless
to consider inter alia the issue of umbrella clauses for the asserted purpose of “mak[ing] certain clarifications concerning the nature of the Contract and the role of the forum selection clause contained
therein.” Id. As Schreuer points out, however, to require an independent treaty violation under the
umbrella clause is to negate its effect, and the reference to the “missing link” is incomprehensible and
quite far from amounting to a clarification. See Schreuer, supra note 161, at 301.
163 See CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, Award, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/01/8, ¶¶ 299-301 (2005).
164 Id. ¶ 296.
165 Id. ¶ 300.
166 Id. ¶ 299.
167 Yannaca-Small, supra note 156, ¶ 127 (quoting Consorzio Groupement L.E.S.I.-DIPENTA v.
The Republic of Algeria, Award, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/08, ¶ 25(ii) (2005), as translated
by the Secretariat). See also Waste Mgmtl, Inc. v. United Mexican States, Arbitral Award, ICSID (W.
Bank) Case No. ARB (AF)/00/3, ¶ 73 (2004) available at http://www.economia-snci.gob.mx/sphp_page
s/importa/sol_contro/consultoria/Casos_Mexico/Waste_2_management/laudo/laudo_ingles.pdf (noting
in dicta that “an ‘umbrella clause’ commit[s] the host State to comply with its contractual commit ments”).
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when the umbrella clause is phrased in the imperative—which, incidentally,
was the case in both Joy Mining and CMS—it must be held to apply wit hout exception to all contractual obligations.168 In Eureko B.V. v. Poland, the
Tribunal commented thus on the umbrella clause in the Netherlands-Poland
BIT:
The plain meaning—the ‘ordinary meaning’—of a provision prescribing that a State ‘shall
observe any obligations it may have entered into’ with regard to certain foreign investments
is not obscure. The phrase ‘shall observe’ is imperative and categorical. ‘Any’ obligations is
capacious [sic]; it means not only obligations of a certain type, but ‘any’—that is to say,
all—obligations entered into with regard to investments of investors of the other Contracting
Party.169

Other decisions, however, while agreeing that the umbrella clause applies in general to contractual obligations, have stopped short of holding
that it applies without exception to all such obligations. In Noble Ventures,
Inc. v. Romania,170 the Tribunal examined the umbrella clause in the United
States-Romania BIT, which provides that “[e]ach Party shall observe any
obligation it may have entered into with regard to investments.”171 Although
the Tribunal acknowledged that the wording of the umbrella clause was “a
clear reference to investment contracts,” 172 it declined “to express any definitive conclusion as to whether . . . [the umbrella clause] perfectly assimilates to breach of the BIT any breach by the host State of any contractual
obligation” on the ground that its conclusions in that case would not be
affected by the resolution of that question. 173
Much more ambiguous is the decision of Sempra Energy International
v. Argentina.174 In that case, the Tribunal noted that the dispute before it
arose from the manner in which “the violation of contractual commitments
with the [claimant] licensees, expressed in the license and other acts, impacts the rights the investor claims to have in the light of the provisions of
the treaty and the guarantees on the basis of which it made the protected
investment.”175 It then went on to hold that it had jurisdiction over the investor’s claim since it was “founded on both the contract and the [BIT]”
168

Eureko B.V. v. Poland,, Partial Award on Liability, ¶ 246 (ad hoc arbitration of Aug. 19, 2005),
available at http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/Eureko-Poland-LiabilityAward.pdf.
169 Id.
170 Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, Award, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/11 (2005),
available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Noble.pdf.
171 Id. ¶ 46.
172 Id. ¶ 51.
173 Id. ¶ 61 (emphasis in original).
174 Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/16 (2005).
175 Id. ¶ 100.
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and “[t]he fact that the [BIT] also includes the specific guarantee of a general ‘umbrella clause,’ . . . involving the obligation to observe contractual
commitments concerning the investment, creates an even closer link between the contract, the context of the investment and the Treaty.”176 Because the Tribunal did not specify which BIT provisions it regarded the
claims to be premised upon, it is not entirely clear whether the Tribunal
would have found jurisdiction over purely contractual claims by virtue of
the umbrella clause, let alone over all contractual claims.
Thus, while the decisions following the SGS cases adopt in general a
more expansive reading of the umbrella clause’s scope, they do not agree
on whether it extends to every contractual obligation. As the discussion
below illustrates, however, the language and purpose of the umbrella
clause, as informed by its history, reveals that the more reasonable interpretation is that the umbrella clause extends to all obligations arising under
any investment contract between a State party to the BIT and an investor of
the other State party.
IV. DISCUSSION
Following the divergent decisions in the two SGS cases, the question
that has emerged in the debate over umbrella clauses is two-fold: (1)
whether any and all breaches of investor-State contracts are also BIT violations under the umbrella clause, and if so; (2) whether the BIT tribunal may
exercise jurisdiction over claims concerning breaches of contract notwithstanding any exclusive forum sele ction clause in the contract designating a
different forum for the resolution of disputes.
A.

The Scope of the Umbrella Clause In Relation to Contractual Disputes

On the question of whether umbrella clause applies to all breaches of
contract, the approach adopted in SGS v. Philippines is eminently preferable to that in SGS v. Pakistan. As pointed out in the former decision, the
natural interpretation of a broadly-worded umbrella clause referring simply
to “obligations” is that it includes contractual obligations, a reading further
supported by the BIT’s purpose of encouraging investments.177 This also
accords with well-established standards of interpreting treaties under international law as laid out in the Vienna Convention of the Law of the Treaties, which provides that “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
176
177

Id. ¶ 101.
See supra Part III.B.1.
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accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty
in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”178
In referring without qualification to investment “obligations,” the “ordinary meaning” of that term indubitably includes contractual obligations.
Indeed, since previous ICSID cases dealing with pre-contractual claims
have determined that no investment is made until a contract is concluded,179
and since umbrella clauses apply only to obligations regarding investment,
the umbrella clause simply has no “clear meaning” if contractual obligations are excluded from its scope.180 To paraphrase the SGS v. Pakistan Tribunal’s interpretation of Article 9 (the forum selection clause) of the Switzerland-Pakistan BIT, if the umbrella clause relates to any obligations between an investor and a Contracting Party, it must comprehend those obligations arising in a contract between them since any other view would
erode significantly the meaning of an umbrella clause.181
The Tribunal in SGS v. Pakistan turned this issue on its head, however, in rejecting SGS’s interpretation of the umbrella clause on the ground
that it rendered superfluous other substantive standards of treatment prescribed in the treaty since the BIT could be invoked by a mere breach of
contract.182 Yet, this reasoning is erroneous since such substantive provisions of the BIT encompass standards that are not typically addressed in
contracts, ni cluding fair and equitable treatment, “most-favored-nation”

178

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (emphasis added), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969). See also Eureko B.V. v. Poland,
Partial Award on Liability, ¶¶ 246-7 (ad hoc arbitration of Aug. 19, 2005), available at
http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/Eureko-Poland-LiabilityAward.pdf (basing its interpret ation of a BIT on the “authoritative codification the law of treaties [that] is the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties” and noting that the “ordinary meaning” of obligations includes contractual obligations).
179 See, e.g., Mihaly Int’l Corp. v. Sri Lanka, Award, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/00/2, ¶¶ 48,
51 (2002), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/mihaly -award.pdf (holding that precontractual expenses incurred do not amount to an investment).
180 Société Général de Surveillance S. A. v. Philippines, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to
Jurisdiction, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/6, ¶ 125 (2004), reprinted in 19 MEALEY 'S INT’L.
ARB. REP . 6 (2004). It might be argued, however, that the umbrella clauses could have been designed
rather to apply exclusively to such precontractual obligations. This argument has the perverse effect,
however, of greatly broadening the effect of the umbrella clause and the BIT when such a consequence
was precisely that relied on in SGS v. Pakistan for refusing to extend umbrella clauses to investor-State
contracts. See supra Part III.A.2. In any event, nothing in the history of the umbrella clause would
appear to support such an interpretation. See supra Part II.
181 See supra text accompanying note 97 (quoting Société Général de Surveillance S. A. v. Pakistan, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/13,
¶150 (2003), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/SGS-decision.pdf).
182 See supra Part III.A.2.
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status, non-discrimination, and protection from expropriation. 183 Conveniently, the Tribunal in SGS v. Pakistan also failed to articulate what the
umbrella clause applied to if not contractual obligations.184 It was thus content for the clause to be superfluous even as it complained about other provisions being made redundant.
Even assuming the meaning of “obligations” or “commitments” is
ambiguous, prior commentary on the umbrella clause’s effects and its history support the more inclusive interpretation adopted in SGS v. Philippines.185 As described above, the extended history of the umbrella clause
demonstrates that it was specifically intended to apply to investor-State
contracts, and was designed to overcome the presumption that a breach of
contract did not engage international responsibility. 186
Additionally, the one ICSID decision that touched on the issue before
either of the SGS cases, Fedax v. Venezuela,187 also concluded that a State’s
breach of a contractual obligation owed to an investor constituted a BIT
violation. 188 In that case, Venezuela failed to honor certain promissory notes
it had issued, and the respondent sought recovery under the NetherlandsVenezuela BIT.189 Article 3 of the BIT was an umbrella clause requiring
each State to “observe any obligation it may have entered into with regard
to the treatment of investments of nationals of the other Contracting Party,”
and Article 9(1) and (3) of the BIT limited investor-State arbitration to disputes over obligations under the BIT.190 While it did not address the umbrella clause directly, the Tribunal determined that Venezuela’s failure to
meet its obligations under the promissory notes amounted to a BIT violation:
. . . Venezuela is under the obligation to honor precisely the terms and conditions governing
such investment, laid down mainly in [the umbrella clause of the BIT], as well as to honor

183

See Schreuer, supra note 3 , at 253 (“The BIT’s substantive provisions deal with . . . issues . . .
not normally covered in contracts. Therefore, extending the BIT’s protection to investment contracts
would not make the substance of a BIT superfluous.”).
184 See Philippines, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/6 ¶ 125 (noting that “the [SGS v. Pakistan] Tribunal failed to give any clear meaning to the ‘umbrella clause’”).
185 See supra Part II.
186 Id.
187 Fedax N.V. v. Venezuela, Award, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/96/3 (1998), reprinted in
37 I.L.M. 1391 (1998).
188 Id. ¶ 29.
189 Id. ¶¶ 1, 26.
190 Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Neth.-Venez., Oct.
22, 1991, 1788 U.N.T.S. 70; see Schreuer, supra note 3, at 252; see also Venezeula. ICSID (W. Bank)
Case No. ARB/96/3 ¶ 30.
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the specific payments established in the promissory notes issued, and the Tribunal so finds in
the terms of Art icle 9(3) of the [BIT].191

In sum, contrary to the decision in SGS v. Pakistan, the proper interpretation of the umbrella clause consistent with its unqualified language,
history and prior commentary is that it extends to all breaches of investorState contracts relating to investments. The first question in our two-part
inquiry on umbrella clauses thus answered, we now consider the more challenging but less explored question of the effect of an exclusive forum sele ction clause in the contract on the application of umbrella clauses.192
B.

Exercising Jurisdiction Under the BIT Notwithstanding an Exclusive
Forum Selection Clause in the Contract

While the Tribunal in SGS v. Philippines determined that it had jurisdiction over SGS’s contractual dispute by virtue of the umbrella clause, it
nevertheless found it inappropriate to exercise such jurisdiction in view of
the exclusive forum selection clause in the contract. But this is to take away
with one hand what was given with the other, leaving investors no less
empty-handed than they were under SGS v. Pakistan. Indeed, as discussed
below, the Tribunal’s approach in SGS v. Philippines is not only untenable
in practice for effectively rendering the umbrella clause a nullity and creating other practical difficulties, it is also misguided in theory for failing to
comprehend the relationship between breaches of contract and treaty violations under an umbrella clause. The Tribunal also failed to apply the correct
principles of contractual interpretation in resolving the conflict between
umbrella clauses and forum selection clauses in contracts. The better interpretation of the umbrella clause allows for its application notwithstanding
contractual forum selection clauses.

191

Venezuela , ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/96/3 ¶ 29.
While commentary following the SGS decisions takes the Tribunal in SGS v. Pakistan to task
for its decision in some detail, see, e.g., Alexandrov, supra note 6, at 569-72, Gill et al., supra note 33,
at 411-2, Schreuer, supra note 3, at 254-255, it does not much analyze, if at all, the decision of the
Tribunal in SGS v. Philippines to stay its proceeding. See Alexandrov, supra note 6, at 575 n.119 (not ing in a footnote that the BIT did not give SGS an alternative route for the resolution of its contractual
dispute in SGS v. Philippines even though the tribunal determined that it had jurisdiction over the
claims because the forum selection clause in the contract prevailed over the BIT’s jurisdictional clause);
Gill et al., supra note 33 (no discussion of the issue); Schreuer, supra note 3 (same). But cf. Emmanuel
Gaillard, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Jurisdiction Over Contract Claims—the SGS Cases Considered, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION 334, 344-45 (Todd Weiler ed., 2005)
(discussing problems associated with the stay decision).
192
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The Tribunal’s Approach in Practice
a.

A Superfluous Umbrella Clause

As its history shows, the umbrella clause was specifically designed to
ensure that disputes under investor-State contracts would be resolved in a
neutral forum and enforced as a matter of international law.193 Notably, in
supporting its determination that the umbrella clause includes contractual
obligations, the Tribunal in SGS v. Philippines stated that the umbrella
clause “addresses . . . [and provides] assurances to foreign investors with
regard to the performance of obligations assumed . . . with regard to specific investments—in effect, to help secure the rule of law in relation to
investment protection.”194 This ties in with the fact that a core, if not the
most significant, advantage afforded to investors under the BIT is their
right to resolve relevant investment disputes with the host State in accordance with the BIT’s dispute settlement provisions.195
Notwithstanding its earlier determination, however, the Tribunal concluded that an umbrella clause in a BIT does not override, and is thus inoperative in the presence of an exclusive forum selection clause in a contract.
What this means, however, is that under the Tribunal’s interpretation, the
umbrella clause will only have effect in one of two scenarios: (a) where the
contract’s forum selection clause designates the same forum as the BIT;
and (b) where the contract does not contain a forum selection clause. Yet,
the umbrella clause is redundant in the first scenario, and the second scenario occurs only infrequently since many if not most investment contracts
provide for the resolution of disputes.196
193

See supra Part II.
Société Général de Surveillance S. A. v. Philippines, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to
Jurisdiction, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/6, ¶ 126 (2004), reprinted in 19 MEALEY 'S INT’L.
ARB. REP. 6 (2004) (second emphasis added).
195 See Société Général de Surveillance S. A. v. Philippines, Decision by One of the Arbitrators
(“Crivellaro Declaration”), ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/6, ¶¶ 5-6 (2004), available at http://ww
w.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/SGSvPhil-declaration.pdf.
196 See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Forum Selection in International Contract Litigation: The Role of
Judicial Discretion, 12 W ILLAMETTE J. I NT’L L. & DISP . RESOL . 185, 189 (2004) (noting that most
transnational contracts contain a forum selection clause); William W. Park, Text and Context in International Dispute Arbitration, 15 B.U. INT’L L. J. 191, 192 (1997) (noting that “many international contracts include a forum selection mechanism, which typically falls into one of two categories: (i) a jurisdiction clause that grants exclusive adjudicatory competence to designated courts; or (ii) an arbitration
clause that provides for disputes arising out of the contract to be settled under the rules of a relatively
neutral arbitral instit ution”). Cf. Antonin I. Pribetic, "Strangers in a Strange Land"—Transnational
Litigation, Foreign Judgment Recognition, and Enforcement in Ontario , 13 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & P OL’ Y
347, 348 (2004) (“Many [international sales] contracts include a standard clause in which the parties
194
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All of which is to leave the umbrella clause with practically nothing to
do. Nor are these consequences ameliorated in any way by the Tribunal’s
characterization of the issue as one going to admissibility rather than jurisdiction. In finding without exercising jurisdiction, but nonetheless staying
the proceedings pending a determination by the Philippines’ courts of “the
scope or extent of the Respondent’s obligation” under the contract,197 it is
not clear what, if anything, is left for the Tribunal to resolve in such an arrangement. As one commentator complained, the decision “results in the
BIT tribunal having jurisdiction over an empty shell and depriv[es] the BIT
dispute resolution provision of any meaning.”198
Thus, the Tribunal’s criticism of the interpretation in SGS v. Pakistan
as superfluous is equally applicable to its own, namely that it “failed to give
any clear meaning to the ‘umbrella clause.’”199 To quote the Tribunal, the
umbrella clause “if it has any effect at all”—not to mention some teeth—
“confers jurisdiction on an international tribunal, and needs to do so with
adequate certainty.”200
b.

Problems Associated with Staying the Proceedings

The Tribunal’s approach of staying its proceedings also raises other
intractable problems. For example, it is not clear under what circumstances
the stay would be lifted, and the Tribunal has conveniently neglected to
delineate the same. Presumably, it will not lift its stay for a reconsideration
of the state court’s judgment on the merits (since that is tantamount to making a determination on the very obligation it has declared is reserved for the
state court), but will do so where there is, for example, fraud or a “miscarriage of justice.”201 Where does one draw the line? Is the re, for example, a
denial of justice when the Philippines court awards an arbitrary amount not
substantiated or explained in its judgment, or if the court refuses to award
interest on the judgment? Even assuming such a line can be drawn, for the
Tribunal to recognize only extra-contractual circumstances as justifying the
lifting of the stay “means that [the] Tribunal is restricting, in practice, its
agree that any dispute between them is subject to arbitration or to the exclusive jurisdiction of a given
court.”); John Fellas, Choice of Forum in International Litigation, in INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
LITIGATION & ARBITRATION 2002, at 41, 69 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Series
No. 670, 2002) (“Many contracts in the international commercial context contain forum selection
clauses”).
197 See Philippines, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/6 ¶¶ 174-75.
198 Gaillard, supra note 192, at 334.
199 Philippines, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/6 ¶ 125.
200 Id. (emphasis added).
201 Crivellaro Declaration, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/6 ¶ 12.
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jurisdiction to BIT claims only, after affirming in theory, that Article VIII
and X(2) of the BIT confer on the Tribunal jurisdiction over also purely
contractual claims.”202 It is, in other words, an exercise in inconsistency.
In carving out the particular issue of the scope of SGS’s obligation as
a matter governed by contract, but otherwise retaining jurisdiction over the
dispute as a question for the BIT,203 the Tribunal appears to assume that the
dispute has various components that may be parceled out and respectively
resolved. 204 Leaving aside the difficulties already discussed above in defining such components, the Tribunal’s approach is problematic in that it distorts both the contractual forum selection clause and the relevant BIT provisions. Specifically, the settlement provisions of both the CISS Agreement
and the BIT provide for the settlement of the relevant “dispute” in its entirety; the former refers “[a]ll actions concerning disputes in connection
with the [CISS Agreement]”205 to the Philippines courts, and the latter authorizes the investor to refer all “disputes with respect to investments between a Contracting Party and an investor of the other Contracting
Party.”206 Nothing in these provisions contemplates, much less authorizes,
the determination of different components of the dispute (whatever they
may be) in different fora.
2.

The Tribunal’s Approach in Theory
a.

The Relationship Between a Breach of Contract and a
Treaty Violation Under an Umbrella Clause

In addition to engendering substantial practical difficulties, the Tribunal’s approach of staying its proceedings is theoretically misguided. At the
heart of its erroneous decision is a misunderstanding of the nature of a BIT
violation under an umbrella clause, and its relation to a breach of contract.
Specifically, in seeking to characterize different components of the dispute
as a function of a contract or a BIT, the Tribunal’s approach in SGS v. Philippines is improperly based on that adopted in the Vivendi annulment deci202

Id.
The Tribunal notes that a claimant may press ahead with its claim before an international tribunal where the “obstacle to admissibility” (i.e., the determination by the Philippines court in this case)
has been removed. Philippines, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/6 ¶ 171. The Tribunal also notes
that “[o]ther questions could perhaps arise, even if the amount payable were to be determined by the
[Philippines Courts]” Id. ¶174 n.100.
204 Cf. id. ¶ 134 (the Tribunal noting that its decision sought “to give effect to the parties’ contracts
while respecting the general language of BIT dispute settlement provisions”).
205 Id. ¶ 137 (quoting Article 12 of the CISS Agreement) (emphasis added).
206 Id. ¶ 130 (quoting Article VIII of the BIT) (emphasis added).
203
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sion. 207 Vivendi noted that breaches of contract and breaches of treaty ult imately relate to independent standards, and that a tribunal’s task in the face
of a dispute that implicated both was to determine if “the fundamental basis
of the claim” is the contract or the treaty. 208 Where the claim’s fundamental
basis was determined to be a contract, any exclusive forum selection clause
in the contract controlled the dispute; where the claim’s basis was a treaty,
however, the BIT’s dispute settlement provisions take effect and the BIT
tribunal must assume jurisdiction thereof.209
Significantly, however, while Vivendi involved an exclusive forum selection clause in the contract that referred any dispute arising there under to
the courts of the host State, it did not involve an umbrella clause. Rather,
the question was whether a BIT tribunal could dismiss claims by the investor based on alleged BIT violations that also resembled contractual claims
on the ground that the intertwined “nature” of the claims made it “impossible” for the tribunal to distinguish one from the other without scrutinizing
the contract, a task assigned to the state court according to the tribunal’s
view of the contract’s forum selection clause.210 The ad hoc Committee in
Vivendi found that by “actually fail[ing] to decide whether or not the conduct in question amounted to a breach of the BIT,” 211 the Tribunal improperly abdicated its responsibility for making that initial determination. The
forum selection clause in the contract did not relieve the Tribunal of that
responsibility as:
it is one thing to exercise contractual jurisdiction . . . and another to
take into account the terms of a contract in determining whether there has
been a breach of a distinct standard of international law, such as that reflected in [the BIT provision providing for fair and equitable treatment].212
In annulling the dismissal of the investors’ claims, the Committee
fashioned a test for distinguishing between breaches of contract and treaty
violations, which was to determine whether a claim’s “fundamental” or

207 Compañia de Aguas del Aconquija, S.A. & Vivendi Universal v. Argentine Republic, Decision
on Annulment, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/97/3 (2002), reprinted in 41 I.L.M. 1135 (2002).
208 See Philippines, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/6 ¶ 153 (noting in support of its decision
to give effect to the forum selection clause in the contract that “‘where the essential basis of a claim
brought before an international tribunal is a breach of contract, the tribunal will give effect to any valid
choice of forum clause in the contract’”) (citing Vivendi, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/97/3 ¶ 98).
209 See Vivendi, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/97/3 ¶ 101.
210 Compañia de Aguas del Aconquija, S.A. & Vivendi Universal v. Argentine Republic, Award,
ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/9 7/3, 3 (2000), reprinted in 40 I.L.M. 426, 428-29 (2001).
211 Compañia de Aguas del Aconquija, S.A. & Vivendi Universal v. Argentine Republic, Decision
on Annulment, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/97/3, ¶ 111 (2002), reprinted in 41 I.L.M. 1135
(2002).
212 Id. ¶ 105.
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“essential” basis was of a contract or a treaty, and to treat it as such accordingly. 213
However, such an inquiry, which examines whether a claim is more
akin to a contract or a treaty, is not meaningful with respect to claims based
on the umbrella clause, which recognizes all contractual breaches as BIT
violations, and characterizes them as such. In partic ular, the Vivendi test
assumes in its distinction between the two that the relevant BIT provision
sets “a distinct standard” from that contained in contracts, and does not
comprehend the effects of an umbrella clause, which defines a BIT violation as any breach of the contract.
Significantly, while claims premised on the umbrella clause are defined by reference to the terms of contract, this act of incorporating the contract does not alter the fact that the claims ultimately are BIT claims whose
“nature” is wholly that of treaty claims. Indeed, if it is at all applicable, the
Vivendi test, which calls for a BIT tribunal to assume jurisdiction over
claims whose “fundamental basis” is a treaty notwithstanding any exclusive
forum selection clause in the contract,214 must a fortiori require the same for
BIT claims as defined under the umbrella clause. Relevantly, the ad hoc
Committee in Vivendi noted that “[a] state cannot rely on an exclusive jurisdiction clause in a contract to avoid the characterization of its conduct as
internationally unlawful under a treaty.”215

213 See id. ¶ 101; see also Société Général de Surveillance S. A. v. Philippines, Decision of the
Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/6, ¶ 153 (2004), reprinted
in 19 MEALEY'S INT’ L. ARB. REP. 6 (2004).
214 Id. ¶ 105. Several other cases that did not involve umbrella clauses have looked at the question
of whether a BIT tribunal may exercise jurisdiction under a broad dispute resolution clause in the BIT
over alleged violations of a BIT that also relate to the underlying investment contract, notwithstanding
an exclusive forum selection clause in the contract. See, e.g., Salini Construttori SpA v. Morocco, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/00/4 (2001), reprinted in 42 I.L.M. 609, 614
(2003); LANCO Int’l, Inc. v. Argentine Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/97/6 (1998), reprinted in 40 I.L.M. 457 (2001). As with Vivendi, these cases can be read to support a BIT tribunal exercising jurisdiction over claims based on umbrella clauses insofar as they affirm a
BIT tribunal’s jurisdiction over such asserted treaty-based claims, which they do. See, e.g., Salini,
ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/00/4 ¶¶ 61, 62 (determining inter alia that the BIT tribunal has jurisdiction to hear all claims based on a violation of the BIT and over contract breaches that simultaneously
amounted to BIT violations notwithstanding a contractual forum selection clause).
215 Compañia de Aguas del Aconquija, S.A. & Vivendi Universal v. Argentine Republic, Decision
on Annulment, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/97/3, ¶ 105 (2002), reprinted in 41 I.L.M. 1135
(2002).
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Applicable Principles of Contractual Interpretation

Not only is the basis of the Tribunal’s decision to stay the proceedings
suspect, the Tribunal’s interpretation and application of particular princ iples of contract law to resolve the conflict between the BIT and the contract
is likewise mistaken.
The Tribunal declined to read BIT provisions as overriding forum selection clauses in contractual claims on the ground that a general provision
in a broad framework treaty should not be presumed to take precedence
over a specific provision in a negotiated contract.216 In particular, the Trib unal considered such an interpretation implausible, as it would otherwise be
impossible to hold investors to any agreement to an exclusive jurisdiction
clause in their contracts since “they will always have the hidden capacity to
bring contractual claims to BIT arbitration.”217
But this premise is false. It is entirely open to States to introduce la nguage in their BITs limiting the effect umbrella clauses and/or BIT settlement provisions have on contracts containing a forum selection clause.218
Alternatively, with respect to investment contracts existing at the time of
the BIT, a State could have inserted language in the BIT specifically excluding any such contract from its scope. Similarly, in the case of investment contracts entered into after the BIT was concluded, the State could
have inserted la nguage in those contracts excluding the application of any
relevant BIT to such contracts (and can continue to do the same for future
contracts). The latter possibility explains why simply applying a presumption that BIT provisions override the forum selection clause in general does
not mean, as the Tribunal contends, that a “government [has agreed] to the
adjudication for the future of an indefinite range of cases in a number of
different forums with different rules.”219
Rather, the proper question here is whether the onus should be on the
State or the investor to clarify any potential conflict between the BIT and
216 Société Général de Surveillance S. A. v. Philippines, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to
Jurisdiction, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/6, ¶ 141 (2004), reprinted in 19 MEALEY 'S INT’L.
ARB. REP. 6 (2004).
217 Id. ¶ 134.
218 See Société Général de Surveillance S. A. v. Philippines, Decision by One of the Arbitrators
(“Crivellaro Declaration”), ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/6, ¶ 5 (2004), available at http://www.
worldbank.org/icsid/cases/SGSvPhil-declaration.pdf (noting that “A BIT can certainly limit the investor’s freedom of choice, for instance providing that a forum which has already been agreed in a past
investment agreement remains the “exclusive” forum for disputes arising from that investment agreement. Such a limitation is not uncommon in BITs practice”).
219 Id. ¶ 153. For the same reason, the dissent’s suggestion that the umbrella clause should apply
only to contracts concluded before the BITs where the BIT does not clarify any potential conflict between the two is mistaken. See supra Part IV.B.2.a.
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the contract. Significantly, as between the State and investor, the State
alone is party to both agreements. Accordingly, only the State can be held
responsible for such conflict, and any resulting ambiguity must be construed against it and in favor of the investor. Thus, in SGS v. Philippines,
since the Philippines alone was party to both the BIT and the CISS Agreement (with SGS being party only to the latter), the conflict between the BIT
provisions and Article 12 of the CISS Agreement should be resolved
against the Philippines.
The Tribunal also relies on the principle that “a party to a contract
cannot claim on that contract without itself complying with it.”220 But this
ignores the umbrella clause’s effect, which, as explained above, makes it a
violation of the BIT to breach the contract. That the umbrella clause incorporates the terms of the contract in defining a BIT violation does not
change the singular treaty character of the resulting BIT violation.
Additionally, the party here, SGS, based its claim on the BIT. As the
Tribunal itself acknowledged, “it is for the Claimant to formulate its case.
Provided the facts as alleged by the Claimant and as appearing from the
initial pleadings fairly raise questions of breach of one or more of the provisions of the BIT, the Tribunal has jurisdiction to determine the claim.”221
Taken together, the reference point for the inquiry is the BIT and not
the contract. It could equally be said of the Philippines that it should not be
entitled to reap the benefits of the BIT (for example, in encouraging continued investment) without being bound by its obligations. Since the issue
here concerns a BIT violation and not a mere contractual breach, it is the
State that “should not be able to approbate and reprobate in respect of the
same agreement.”222 Accordingly, SGS should be entitled under the BIT
provisions to bring claims based on breaches of contract to the Tribunal.
C.

The Broader Sanctity of Contract Principle

In interpreting the umbrella clause, the Tribunal’s overarching task is
to determine what the Contracting States agreed would be the effect of the
clause. To do so in accordance with well-established principles of international law, the Tribunal needs to read the clause objectively to determine its
meaning. 223 As discussed above, the most reasonable interpretation of a
broadly worded clause in light of its plain language, history and purpose is

220

Philippines, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/6 ¶ 154.
Id. ¶ 157.
222 Id. ¶ 155.
223 See supra text accompanying notes 177-80.
221
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that it applies without exception to investment contracts.224 This, then, is
what we must deem the parties to have agreed upon. Having made this bargain, it is imperative that the Contracting States be held to their agreement.
Critically, at stake here is the investor’s ability to resolve contractual
investment disputes in a neutral and international forum, a core benefit of
the BIT affirmatively provided for under the agreement between the Contracting States, and, therefore, one the investor legitimately expects to receive. Allowing the host State to renege on its agreement creates uncertainty in the global marketplace and can serve only to discourage foreign
investment, a result at odds with the very purpose of BITs. The more
broadly applicable principle here, therefore, is that of the sanctity of contract, not simply as between the host State and the investor over an investment contract, but also as between Contracting States over a BIT.
D.

A Summing Up of the Umbrella Clause’s Proper Construction

The Tribunal’s decision in SGS v. Philippines to stay its proceedings is
erroneous. Not only is the rationale based on a misapprehension of the nature of a BIT violation as defined under an umbrella clause and the applic able rules for resolving conflicts between BITs and investor-State contracts,
it has the practical consequence of eviscerating the umbrella clause itself.
An exclusive contractual forum selection clause should not be permitted to
prevail over the umbrella clause and the BIT’s dispute settlement provisions. There are two reasons the forum selection clause should not prevail.
First, a BIT violation arising under the umbrella clause is no less redressible under the BIT for being defined by reference to the contract (whose
terms are simply incorporated into the umbrella clause). Second, the conflict between BIT provisions and the forum selection clause in the contract
arises from an ambiguity that should be resolved against the State, who
alone is party to both the BIT and the contract.
Thus, to answer the two-part question posed by this article on umbrella clauses, the more reasonable and effective interpretation of the umbrella clause is that it applies to obligations arising under the relevant investor-State investment contract, and a BIT tribunal may thereby exercise jurisdiction over breach of contract claims, including when the contract contains an exclusive forum selection clause.

224

See supra Part IV.A-B.
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A BROADER P ERSPECTIVE ON THE UMBRELLA CLAUSE DEBATE

14:1

On one level, the problem of the umbrella clause is about what princ iples of contractual interpretation should be brought to bear on a provision
that redefines the relationship between contractual breaches and treaty violations in investor-State disputes. But there is a broader perspective that
takes into account the history and nature of investment arbitration. Namely,
that it manifests the long-standing tension between the priorities of deve loping as opposed to developed nations in the context of foreign investment.
A.

The Asymmetrical Effect of Umbrella Clauses

Historically, foreign investment capital flowed principally in one direction—from developed to developing countries.225 As such, a significant
proportion of BITs are between a developed country on the one hand and a
developing country on the other.226 Therefore, even though the BIT imposes
reciprocal obligations on both Contracting States, its effects are asymmetrical since the host State is typically a developing country while the investor
is often a national from a developed country. The result is that developing
225 See Catherine Brown & Christine Manolakas, Trade in Technology Within the Free Trade
Zone: The Impact of the WTO Agreement, NAFTA, and Tax Treaties on the NAFTA Signatories, 21 NW.
J. INT’L L. & BUS. 71, 97 n.176 (2000) (noting that “capital investment flows primarily from the developed country to the developing country”).
226 Teresa McGhie, Bilateral and Multilateral Investment Treaties, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN
DIRECT I NVESTMENT 107, 108 (Daniel D. Bradlow & Alfred Escher, eds., 1999) (“Most BITs are between a developed or capital exporting country and a developing country.”). Also, the WORLD
I NVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 5 at 27, notes that as of the end of 2004, forty percent of BITs concluded were those between developed and developing countries. Critically, the W ORLD INVESTMENT
REPORT does not simply divide the world into developing and developed countries, but also includes
two other categories, namely South East Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States, which
includes all of the republics that were part of the former USSR, except the Baltic States. See WORLD
I NVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 5, at 6, 27. Additionally, the eight of the ten countries that joined the
European Union on May 1, 2004 (and that were formerly classified as part of Central and Eastern
Europe) were reclassified as developed countries. Id. Assuming one classifies these countries as either
“developed” or developing,” and depending on how one does this, the percentage of BITs concluded
between developed and developing countries may well be much higher. Cf. id .
Note, however, that in recent years, an increasing percentage of BITs are concluded between developing
countries. Indeed, the “largest number of the new BITs signed during 2004 was between developing
countries, with 28 BITs or 38% of the total, followed closely by BITs between developed and developing countries with 27 of all BITs signed.” Id. at 24. As such, the perspective discussed in this article that
the conflict over the interpretation of BIT provisions is one between developed and developing countries will begin increasingly to lose its currency. Nonetheless, as matters stand and certainly from a
historical viewpoint, this perspective remains valid.
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countries will seek to interpret restrictively any BIT provision that accords
rights to the investor and imposes obligations on the Host state favoring
investors, whereas developed countries will read the same provision expansively. The umbrella clause is a prime example of such a BIT provision, as
evidenced by the fact that the disputes in both SGS arbitration proceedings
have played out along these same lines: with Pakistan and the Philippines
(the developing countries) calling for a restrictive interpretation of the umbrella clause, and investors from Switzerland (the developed country) seeking a broader interpretation. 227
This divide separating developed and developing countries in foreign
investment disputes dates back to the formative years of international investment law itself. As described earlier in this article,228 there was no coherent legal regime rela ting to foreign investments in the first half of the
twentieth century. What international legal principles existed concerning
investment rights and obligations were often vague and open to wideranging interpretation. While industrialized countries asserted that international law imposed various obligations on host states to protect foreign investments and to compensate for their expropriation, newly decolonized
and developing countries decried such a view as serving only to entrench
industrialized nations’ economic dominance and to curb their ability to
manage resources within their own borders, thereby infringing on their sovereignty. 229
As the dispute over the construction of the umbrella clause shows, this
conflict between the two sides persists to the present day, even if the talking
points of the debate have evolved. While the earlier disagreement was over
what standards applied to the treatment of investments under international
law, the current dispute is over how agreed-to standards of treating investments should be interpreted.

227 Notably, it is not merely the investors but also their governments who advocate an expansive
interpretation of the umbrella clauses. This is hardly surprising since governments would be expected to
champion the causes of their nationals. Case in point: After the SGS v. Pakistan decision was rendered,
the Swiss authorities sent a letter to the ICSID Secretariat noting that they were “alarmed about the very
narrow interpretation given to the meaning of [the umbrella clauses of the Switzerland-Pakistan BIT],
which . . . runs counter to the intention of Switzerland . . . ” Note on the Interpretation of Article 11 of
the Bilateral Investment Treaty between Switzerland and Pakistan in the light of the Decision of the
Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction of ICSID in Case No. ARB/01/13 SGS Société Générale S.A.
versus Islamic Republic of Pakistan, attachment to Letter from Marino Baldi, Swiss Secretariat for
Economic Affairs, to the ICSID Deputy-Secretary General (Oct. 1, 2003), reprinted in 19 MEALEY ’S
I NT’L ARB. REP. 1 (2004).
228 See Introduction supra .
229 See id.
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First World vs. Third World: The Question of Unconscionable Co ntracts

Under this broader perspective, the debate over umbrella clauses is not
simply a conflict between investors and host States, but one between developed and developing countries. Accordingly, one might argue that in favoring investors over host States, the broader interpretation of umbrella clauses
advanced here also favors developed countries over developing nations, and
such a result may be inequitable because of the presumably greater bargaining power that developed countries have over their developing counterparts.
In other words, to enforce the umbrella clause is possibly to enforce an unconscionable contract against a developing country under economic pressure to enter into a BIT containing such a clause. This argument is flawed,
however.
For one thing, one may equally contend that an investment contract
that exclusively refers disputes to a local forum is in fact an unconscionable
contract favoring the host State and, therefore, developing countries. The
leverage that a host State has in any particular contract may be greater than
the investor since it is dealing with individual companies that presumably
face competition in the global marketplace. It is difficult, for example, to
see how SGS could have been content to submit its disputes to the Philippines courts rather than international arbitration if the playing field were
entirely level.
Relevantly, it bears observing that the enforcement of umbrella
clauses does not lead to a final award on the merits in favor of the investor;
it results rather in an arbitral procedure for resolving the dispute that does
not inherently favor either party. 230 Both parties will have equal say in the
appointment of the tribunal, which will only then begin to consider the merits of the dispute.231 Contrast this with the enforcement of an exclusive forum selection clause like the one in SGS v. Philippines, where a state court
has to resolve a case involving the state government as one of the interested
parties. This latter scenario surely poses the greater risk that one of the parties, in this case, the investor, will not receive a fair hearing. Thus, all else
being equal, it is arguably better to err on the side of the umbrella clause
prevailing over the exclusive forum sele ction clause insofar as it insures a
more equitable result, or at least is seen to do so.
More generally, it should be noted that while the effect of adopting the
interpretation proposed favors investors and developing countries, that re230

See generally REED ET AL ., supra note 3, at ch. 4 (on ICSID arbitration procedure, including
with respect to the constitution of the tribunal).
231 Id.
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sult did not serve as its motivation. Rather, this reading of the umbrella
clause was arrived at through applying the objective, methodical process of
interpreting the BIT, relying both on the relevant language and history of
the clause according to well-established principles of international law.232
That the interpretation happens to favor either party simply follows from
the assessment of what the parties can be said objectively to have agreed
upon.
CONCLUSION
Under this broader perspective, the question of the proper interpretation of umbrella clauses is but the latest chapter in the long-running saga of
conflict between the foreign investment interests of developing and deve loped countries. Even so, this particular chapter is unnecessarily controversial, and more significantly, threatens unjustifiably to close the book on
umbrella clauses. How ironic to find that a clause aimed at preserving the
sanctity of contract is itself at risk of being written off by a larger failure to
respect agreements—not just contracts as between a state and an investor,
but also treaties as between states themselves. Here’s hoping there’s a coda
to this story where its hero comes back to life and gets the happy ending it
deserves.

232

See discussion supra Part III.

